This paper considers the implications for personal income tax and Goods and Services Tax (GST) revenues of population ageing in New Zealand. It considers 'pure' ageing effects; that is, population size is held constant but its age distribution changes over the next 40 years. It might be expected that an increase in the share of pensioners would reduce aggregate incomes while increasing the proportion consumed. However, with age-earnings profiles having a peak in the 45-54 age range, 
Introduction
The New Zealand population, like that of all industrialised countries, is expected to age significantly over the next fifty years, accompanied by an 'ageing of the aged' whereby the proportion of people over 80 is expected to increase substantially. This ageing is likely to produce a reduction in the proportion of income obtained from earnings and a concomitant increase in the proportion of income in the form of social welfare payments, including superannuation. This structural change in income sources, combined with the existence of different spending patterns among individuals in different age groups, may perhaps be expected to give rise to a change in the composition of tax revenue. The possible effects of population ageing on tax revenue and its composition in New Zealand are therefore investigated here, with an emphasis on personal income taxation and GST. 3 The prospect of population ageing has given rise to a wide range of studies.
One group has examined the general equilibrium implications (at a very high level of aggregation) for savings, investment and growth, allowing for the endogenous responses of wages to the changing age distribution. 4 Other studies have concentrated on the possible implications for a range of categories of social expenditure, such as education, health, superannuation, unemployment and sickness benefits, using quite aggregative information about the age-and gender-specific propensities to receive such transfer payments. Even where no allowance is made for endogenous responses, for example to wages, labour force participation and unemployment rates, such projections of social expenditure are subject to a large degree of uncertainty.
5
An alternative approach to the investigation of population ageing is to make use of cross-sectional household surveys, which provide information about the details 3 Excise tax revenue is thus not considered here: the ratio of excise revenue to the sum of income tax and GST is approximately 0.057 currently and is projected to remain around this level with pure population ageing and under current policy settings. 4 For a range of studies of the impacts of ageing, see Creedy (ed.) (1995) and Creedy and Guest (eds.) (2007) . See also Miles (1999) and Disney (1996) . 5 Population and social expenditure projections for New Zealand were reported in Creedy and Scobie (2005) , who also produced confidence intervals, following the approach set out in Alvarado and Creedy (1998) .
-3 -of individuals' incomes from different sources and household expenditure patterns, thereby giving data on income and consumption taxes. Importantly, such surveys reflect the considerable heterogeneity found in populations. All individuals and households in sample surveys of this kind are given survey weights, which allow the sample values of incomes, taxes and so on to be 'grossed up' to population values.
The weights reflect known differential responses and over-sampling of some groups.
Allowance for population ageing can thus be made by reweighting a survey, using independent projections of the population age and gender structure for calibration purposes, as in Cai et al. (2006) . This latter approach is taken here to examine the potential implications for personal income taxes and GST in New Zealand of pure population ageing. That is, Before examining population ageing, Section 2 begins by examining some basic life-cycle patterns of income and consumption. On the assumption that such patterns remain relatively stable, they provide initial information about the effects of changing age distributions. Section 3 briefly describes the population projections and the sample reweighting approach. The implications of pure population ageing for tax revenue and its composition are then explored in Section 4. Conclusions are in Section 5.
Variations with Age
This section briefly describes a number of age-profiles which help to throw some light on the factors influencing the effects of pure population ageing. The cross-sectional variation in individuals' income with age is shown in Figure 1 . 6 Here income is total income from all sources, including transfer payments.
The arithmetic mean, along with the median and upper and lower quartiles, of the distribution in each age group is shown. This diagram displays the typical 'hump shaped' age profile, with the dispersion increasing with age until retirement. After a sharp decrease associated with retirement, the profiles rise slowly, reflecting the existence of savings among the aged: this phenomenon has been observed in studies 6 For a detailed analysis of age-income profiles in New Zealand, see Creedy (1997) .
- The Household Economic Survey includes only those in private dwellings, and thus excludes student accommodation and retirement homes, who may differ systematically from those included. 8 The effects of using alternative definitions of household age (such as average and maximum age) were also examined, but the head's age is preferred.
-6 -The 'humped' shape of the expenditure profile reflects, in part, the variation in household size with age of head. An indication of this variation is given in Figure 3 , which shows, within each age group, the average number of people in the household, the average number of adults and adult-equivalents. The latter was obtained using In understanding the implications for income tax revenue of changes in the age structure, it is necessary to consider the contribution of different income components to total income, and the extent to which the different sources are taxable. A distinguishing feature of the New Zealand direct tax structure is that many transfer payments are included in taxable income: details of the tax treatment of different sources are given in Appendix B. The taxation of transfer payments does not simply represent 'giving with one hand and taking the same amount back with the other hand'. This is because, when taxable transfers are added to other sources of taxable 9 These values replicate the Jensen scales often used in New Zealand.
-7 -income, individuals can move into higher tax brackets, with correspondingly higher marginal tax rates. The progressive nature of the income tax structure means that the average tax rate increases systematically over the whole range of incomes.
Figure 4
Mean The variation with age of household head in arithmetic mean income components, as a proportion of total income, is shown in Figure 4 . As expected, in the -8 -higher age groups, earned income from wage and salary (W&S) and self-employment income falls substantially as transfer payments and, to a lesser extent, capital income become relatively more important. Figure 5 shows age variations in median income, along with upper and lower quartile: the inter-quartile range is indicated by the bars.
In this case only income from wages and salaries and self employment are of significance until retirement age is reached, and only social welfare (SW) taxable income is significant in older age groups. This reflects considerable skewness in the distribution of income from other sources.
The Goods and Services Tax (GST) in New Zealand has a much broader base than similar value-added taxes in other countries. In particular, there are very few exemptions and none for groups such as food and domestic heating. An important implication of this broad base is that indirect tax revenue is likely to be less sensitive than otherwise to variations in the composition of total expenditure resulting from population ageing. Tax structures with considerable selectivity face a greater risk of the tax base being eroded if expenditure shifts towards exempt categories as a result of population ageing.
Nevertheless the coverage is not complete. For example, no GST is imposed on rents, house purchase payments and credit services, including banking fees. The variation, with the age of the household head, in average expenditure and the component parts of GST-liable and non-GST-liable goods and services is shown in Figure 6 . 10 This demonstrates not only the typical humped pattern of expenditure over the life cycle but also the gradual increase with age in the proportion of expenditure devoted to GST-liable goods and services. The hump shape is partly, but not entirely, attributable to variations in household size with age, shown above. In the very old age groups, virtually all expenditure is liable to GST. Some idea of the variation within age groups is shown in Figure 7 , which displays the median and inter-quartile range of the GST-liable and non-GST-liable components. These profiles indicate much greater stability over age groups than those for arithmetic mean.
The life-cycle variations displayed here combine with population ageing to influence variations over time in aggregate tax revenue and its composition. Before examining such variations, the following section briefly discusses the way in which an initial cross-sectional household survey is artificially aged. This is achieved not by ageing the individuals in the dataset, but by adjusting the sample weights attached to different household types in order to achieve specified population age distributions. The data used here are from the Statistics New Zealand web site. 12 Net migration in NZ is hard to predict as it is highly volatile. However, variations in net migration are unlikely to have a significant effect on the age distribution of the population, which is the primary focus here, rather than its absolute size.
-11 - The changing age distributions for males and females combined are shown in The projected age distributions were then used as calibration factors in computing new weights, following the basic method suggested by Deville and Särndal (1992) . This involves generating new sample weights such that the revised age distribution of the population (obtained from the sample survey data using the weights) matches the calibration totals for the relevant year. The objective in revising the weights is to minimise the total distance, over all households, between the new and old weights, where the distance for each household is defined as a specified function of new and old weights. Clearly a wide range of functions could be used, but here the distance function used was the well-known chi-squared function (the square -12 -of the difference between weights divided by the initial weight). An additional constraint was imposed such that the ratio of new to old weights for each household should lie within specified limits. This gives rise to a nonlinear optimisation problem which can be solved using an iterative solution algorithm. In each projection year the limits were varied in order to find the smallest range consistent with the iterative procedure successfully converging. The method is described further in Appendix A below.
The reweighting allowed only for calibration using the projected age distributions. It imposed no changes in, for example, aggregate labour force participation rates in each age group, or unemployment rates by age, or average real earnings by age. Hence, as discussed earlier, the analysis considers the effect of pure population ageing in circumstances in which age-profiles of important variables, such as real incomes, are assumed to remain unchanged. 13 In investigating 'pure ageing', 14 It is therefore possible, as discussed below, to examine the implications of specified policy changes (for example to tax rates and thresholds, and benefit levels and abatement rates), under different population age distributions.
-13 - Figure 10 shows aggregate values of income, revealing that there is in fact little change in total income and taxable income over the projection period. It was mentioned above that the average age of those aged 15 years and over increases to 51.4 in the year 2049/50. When this is combined with the shape of the age-income profile, which does not turn down until some time after age 50, the relative stability in total income is less surprising. There is actually a small increase in measures of income from around 2029/30, but the diagram shows that this is entirely attributable to the role of transfer payments which are expected to increase as a result of population ageing. The contribution of transfer payments to the changing composition of income is also revealed in Figure 11 , which shows the variation of different income measures over the period. The decline in wage and salary and self-employment income (lefthand axis) is accompanied by increases in transfer payments, as expected, and a slight rise in investment income (right-hand axis; note different scale). The latter reflects a greater accumulation of wealth in an older population structure, and roughly compensates for a decline in self-employment income.
15 15 To the extent that there is some 'overtaking', more recent cohorts may be expected to accumulate more wealth at earlier ages, thereby increasing the growth of capital income further.
-14 - 
GST (RHS)
The composition of tax revenue from income tax and GST over the projection period is shown in Figure 12 . Here the share of GST in total revenue is relatively stable at around 25 per cent, but rising slightly over the first two decades. This reflects the relative stability shown above in the share of GST-liable expenditure in total expenditure, along with the stable value of total taxable income, and the fact that agerelated saving rates have been assumed constant. The slight rise in the share of GST (and equivalent fall in personal income tax, PIT) is attributable to the small extent to which expenditure among the aged shifts away from rent, which does not attract GST, -15 -as older households are more likely to own their houses. Although the share of income tax is correspondingly relatively stable, it has been seen above that the source of income tax revenues shifts away from earnings towards taxable transfer payments.
There are two direct consequences of the rise in social welfare income (mainly superannuation) relative to wage/salary and self-employment income. Firstly, with approximately constant income tax plus GST revenues, a greater fraction of that revenue (or equivalent revenue from other taxes) will be required to fund the rising social welfare payments. Secondly, a greater share of income tax plus GST revenue will be contributed by superannuitants as the population ages over the next 40 years.
Clearly both of these depend on the persistence, or otherwise, of existing superannuation and tax policy settings. Figure 13 shows changes in superannuation expenditure (NZS) and Working for Families (WFF) tax credit expenditure, expressed as ratios of total revenue from income tax and GST. The reduced WFF expenditure, associated with fewer children, could be expected to help compensate for rising NZS expenditure. Figure 13 also shows NZS expenditure net of associated income tax payments, net NZS. 16 In fact, receipts become more dependent on the level of state pensions. 16 As mentioned earlier, NZS may take some individuals into higher marginal income tax brackets, but this is ignored in producing the schedule shown above.
-16 - The analysis so far has treated employment participation rates as constant; that is, the demographic ageing process does not induce pre-or post-retirement individuals to increase or extend participation, which may include part-time working. 17 However, increased longevity as well as reduced fertility may be expected to encourage increased labour supply. To give some indication of the potential orders of magnitude involved, suppose income earners (employees and self-employed) aged from 45 to 74 inclusive increase their earned incomes by 10 percent. This amounts to about 40 per 17 The reweighting of the HES is carried out using only age distributions as calibration variables, as described earlier.
-18 -cent of all employed and self-employed income earners. There would be other changes associated with the tax and social welfare system, such as reduced family tax credit entitlement where relevant individuals' incomes increase. Simulations using Taxwell are summarised in Figure 17 , which shows the outcomes for the same variables examined in Figures 15 and 16 . There is also a small reduction in the share of income tax revenue contributed from NZS pensions: this falls from 9.6 per cent in 2049/50 (before the income increases) to 9.1 per cent (after the income increases). This suggests that a substantial increase in participation by older age groups would be required to contribute significantly to improved tax-financing of NZS over the next 20 to 40 years.
Finally, it might be suggested that, with migration playing an important role in New Zealand's labour market, the rising cost of NZS could be partly offset by -21 -fertility rates to encourage increased participation by younger aged females. 19 The feasibility of such an increase in participation is a useful avenue for further research.
Conclusions
This paper has considered the implications for personal income tax and GST revenues of pure population ageing in New Zealand over the next 40 years. It might be expected that an increase in the population share of pensioner groups would reduce aggregate incomes but increase the proportion consumed. However, the evidence presented here suggests this is not the case. With age-earnings profiles revealing an earnings peak in the 45-54 age group, and the expected average age of the population Analysing the impact of changes to income tax rates or the level of Superannuation (NZS) payments shows that changes to NZS rates have a non-trivial effect on the share of income tax and GST contributed from NZS incomes.
The projected substantial increase in the cost of NZS reported here is likely to represent an upper limit. First, no account has been taken of overtaking whereby younger cohorts earn higher real incomes than older cohorts at comparable ages. This would have the effect of increasing the income tax base, as well as the ability of 19 Allowing for age-related participation increases would also need to recognise that as older people decide to remain in the labour force for longer, this is likely to involve fewer hours than the mean for the population as a whole.
-22 -individuals to save for retirement. Secondly, the projected lower fertility is likely to be accompanied by a higher labour force participation rate of women, whereas the reweighting of the HES has been based only on projected population age distributions. Third, no general equilibrium effects have been modelled, but one effect of population ageing is that wages are likely to increase, with associated positive effects on labour force participation. 20 Both effects will combine to increase the revenue from income taxation and extend the age of voluntary retirement. Fourth, projections of future costs and revenues, particularly extended over a long period, are highly sensitive to productivity growth, around which there is much uncertainty.
Despite these positive effects which are likely to reduce the burden below the estimates reported here, it does appear that some difficult choices are inevitable if policy parameters were to remain unchanged. Higher net immigration, as mentioned above, cannot be expected to solve the problem, and anyway no reliance can be placed on this in view of the considerable variability over time in immigration rates.
21
Thus, either tax revenue has to be increased (from income taxation, GST or other sources), or NZS expenditure has to be reduced, or some combination of both.
Increasing personal income taxation rates is likely to be counterproductive if it adversely affects incentives, given the importance of maintaining, and indeed increasing, labour force participation beyond current levels, and encouraging delays in voluntary retirement beyond current levels. Policy changes to NZS settings fall into two categories. First, one possibility, which has been followed in other countries, is to raise the age of entitlement. A second possible policy change is to break the link between NZS and average earnings. The linking with average earnings allows pensioners to share fully in productivity and real income growth, but is more generous than maintaining the real value at a constant level. 22 The existence of a formal link to 20 Endogenous responses to ageing are stressed by Disney (1996) and Guest (2005 Guest ( , 2006 Guest ( , 2007a . 21 To the extent that net immigration rates are sensitive to tax rates in NZ compared with overseas, relative increases in rates over the projection period may be expected to reduce the annual value below that assumed in the projections here but, as mentioned earlier, this is unlikely to affect the age distribution significantly. 22 Following Aaron (1966) and Samuelson (1958) , the tax financing of superannuation, or pensions, on a 'pay as you go' basis (allowing pensioners to share fully in productivity growth) involves a metaphysical 'social contract' among generations, the acceptance of which requires the sum of -23 -wages also reduces the number of degrees of freedom in policy choices available and therefore eliminates one element of flexibility (in upward or downward directions, depending on the circumstances) available to governments.
population and income growth to exceed the real rate of interest. Reduced population growth clearly places a strain on this condition. Clearly, the range of variation in the weights is higher for the last projection period, 2009/10, and for a significant number of households the change is quite large in proportional terms. However, for each projection period and for the majority of households, the adjustment needed to obtain the required overall male and female age distributions is quite small. 
Rank of initial weight
As only one calibration variable -age -has been used to reweight the sample data, it is useful to check if other characteristics, in particular the distribution of income, do not change in an erratic manner. The histograms of the distributions for each year, not shown here, indicated that no distortions appeared to arise from reweighting.
-30 - 
Appendix B. Tax Treatment of Income Sources in NZ

